Recent literature on the workhorse model of intra-industry trade has explored heterogeneous cost structures at the firm level. These approaches have proven to add realism and predictive power. This paper shows, however, that this added realism also implies that there may exist a positive bilateral tariff that maximizes national and world welfare. Applying one of the simplest specifications possible, namely a symmetric two-country intra-industry trade model with fixed export costs that are heterogeneous across firms, we find that the reciprocal reduction of small tariffs reduces welfare.
Introduction
Recently, firm-level heterogeneity has been introduced to intra-industry trade models, e.g. by Schmitt and Yu (2001) , Montagna (2001) , Melitz (2003) , Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Yeaple (2005) . These specifications, where firms are heterogeneous with respect to their cost structures, have provided important new insights, frequently reconciling theory with the stylized facts of international trade. For example Schmitt and Yu (2001) resolve the puzzle of scale economies and the volume of intra-industry trade by introducing firm-level heterogeneous fixed exporting costs. Montagna (2001) examines trade between countries with efficiency asymmetries when firms are heterogeneous with respect to marginal costs. Melitz (2003) features firmlevel heterogeneous marginal costs and analyzes intra-industry reallocations, showing that additional gains from trade stem from the induced productivity improvements. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) introduce firm-level heterogeneities and are able to capture the exporting-versus-FDI decisions of firms. Finally, Yeaple (2005) derives firm heterogeneity from labor force heterogeneities and arrives at realistic predictions concerning the productivity of exporting firms and the effects of trade on the skill premium.
However, thus far the literature has not fully examined the implications of these new -and more realistic -assumptions for the welfare effects of trade policies such as tariffs.
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In this paper, we examine this issue by introducing bilateral ad valorem tariffs into a simple symmetric two-county Krugmantype (1980) intra-industry trade model with firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu (2001) . A second contribution of the present paper is it to extend the literature by presenting the case of firmlevel heterogeneous fixed export costs (i.e. Schmitt and Yu, 2001 ) with an entry mechanism in the manner of Melitz (2003) , i.e. firms make their entry decisions subject to sunk costs and based on expected profits, knowing only the distribution of firm heterogeneity in the population but not their own realization.
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The present model employs several assumptions that promote free trade as a welfare optimum: there are no wasteful (e.g. iceberg) trade costs, the firm-specific fixed costs of exporting are less than the cost of creat- Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004) , examine the welfare effects of reducing iceberg and fixed export costs in a Melitz-type (2003) setting with firm-level heterogeneous marginal costs.
2 Arguably, the entry mechanism in Schmitt and Yu (2001) , where firms' entry decisions are based on reaching breakeven on their home market operation alone, is problematic because in equilibrium export profits exist that do not trigger industry entry. Jørgensen and Schröder (2005b) find, inter alia, that the possibility of a welfare increase from bilateral tariffs established in the present paper for the Meltiz (2003) entry mechanism does also occur for the Schmitt and Yu (2001) entry mechanism.
ing a new variety, and all firm profits and tariff revenues are redistributed in a lump sum fashion to consumers. Still, we find that in this model there is in fact too much trade in the free trade equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing activity than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility. National and world welfare increases when imposing small bilateral tariffs. The welfare maximizing tariff is strictly positive, less than 1 and increases in the degree of product differentiation (love of variety). Thus, reciprocal trade liberalization, in particular the reduction of small tariffs, will be welfare-reducing. The underlying mechanism is that even though small bilateral tariffs reduce the number of traded varieties, the total number of available varieties in both countries is maintained or rather increases slightly. Any tariff reduces the number and volume of traded varieties. In case of a small tariff, fairly inefficient exporters cease their trading activity, and paired with the volume reduction in exports/imports, the total of saved resources more than compensates consumers via the entry and larger volumes of home varieties. However, for large tariffs, a further increase in the tariff forces fairly efficient exporters out of the trading activity, replacing cheaply generated varieties (i.e. imported from abroad) with expensively generated varieties (i.e. produced at home).
The finding of welfare-reducing tariff liberalization contradicts much of the existing literature, see e.g. Markusen and Venables (1988) , Fukushima and Kim (1989) , Lockwood and Wong (2000) . Also in intra-industry trade models, bilateral tariffs are usually welfare-reducing, e.g. Gros (1987) , Jørgensen and Schröder (2005a) .
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The main difference between the above models and the present model is that the earlier work assumes firms to be homogeneous in their cost structure. However, Melitz (2003) , Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004) , all using a Melitz-type (2003) framework with firm-level heterogeneous marginal costs, examine, inter alia, iceberg trade cost reductions, which are often interpreted to represent trade liberalization, and find, in line with earlier literature, an overall welfare gain. Furthermore, Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004) note the possibility for an anti-variety effect. In contrast to the anti-variety effect in the present model, this situation only emerges once the fixed costs of exporting are larger than the fixed costs of pure domestic production, and thus the export activity of a firm ties up more resources than would be required for an additional domestic variety. This case is explicitly ruled out in the present model. The possibility of welfare-reducing trade liberalization is, however, found in Montagna (2001) , in a framework where firms have heterogeneous marginal costs. Yet, a welfare loss occurs in circumstances when trade allows relatively inefficient firms to enter and when consumers' taste for variety is sufficiently low.
The next section presents the model. In Section 3, we derive the welfare effect of imposing bilateral ad valorem tariffs, and discuss the results. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
The starting point is a standard Krugman-type (1980) model of intraindustry trade, yet with the feature of firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu (2001) . Consumers in two identical countries, home and foreign, love variety and have identical preferences, in which all consumption goods, c, enter symmetrically. Utility is given by
More specifically we can write (1) as
where c d,i d is consumption of variant i d of non-exported domestic products, c t,i t is consumption of variant i t of the exported domestic products and c f,i f is consumption of variant i f of imported products.
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The number of variants actually produced (n d , n t , and n f ) is assumed to be large, although smaller than N d , N t and N f . Furthermore, denoting foreign variables by * , the symmetry of the setup implies n t = n * f = n f = n * t and that trade is balanced.
Firms
Firms can produce their specific variant for the home market alone or for both the home and foreign market. The decision to export is firm-endogenous, where some but not all firms will export. Each firm produces with the same constant marginal cost β and a fixed cost α, both expressed in terms of labor, L, which is the only factor of production and is remunerated at the economywide wage rate w. When exporting, a firm faces an additional firm-specific fixed export cost, a i , heterogeneous across firms and, for simplicity, assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, α] , with F (.) denoting the distribution function which is public knowledge. The fixed costs of exporting represent, for example, the cost of building up a distribution network abroad or additional costs of adapting a product to foreign specifications or tastes. Finally, to enter, firms face an initial fixed entry cost f , which is measured in monetary units and sunk, and where 0 < f < α 2 .
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In order to focus on the problem at hand, we avoid several of the complexities of modelling sunk entry costs and the probability of firm 'death' as presented in Melitz (2003) , and instead apply an alternative version, simply envisaging two separate rounds. In particular, production and sales for the home market (and the fixed costs α and f ) are sunk in the sense that they are assumed to occur prior to an exporting round, in which the individual a i 's are revealed and export production -if the firm chooses so -and sales take place. Trade is costly. Both countries charge the same ad valorem tariff τ ∈ (0, 1) on imports, i.e. a bilateral tariff. The presence of fixed export costs and the tariff creates an asymmetry between trading and non-trading firms, and hence, the profit functions of a pure domestic firm only servicing the home market, and an exporting home firm servicing both markets, are
where x d is the production of a pure domestic firm, and x t and x z are the output of an exporting firm to the home and the foreign market respectively. Finally, various market-clearing relations complete the model: goods market clear
, where the foreign index i f and the home index i t denote one and the same variant; income expenditure clearing
where R denotes the profits of all domestic firms (excluding f ) and all tariff revenues assumed to be lump-sum redistributed to consumers; and similar relations for the foreign country.
5 The fixed entry costs capture some form of fee payment required in order to enter the industry and are bound by the maximum expected profits of export activity, which -as will become clear below -are equal to α 2 . The costs f could also represent the threshold return (premium) demanded by entrepreneurs in order to cover the risk (since a i draws are uncertain) they take when establishing a firm, or the costs of bank lending. 6 We are grateful to Marc Melitz for pointing out this short-cut.
Prices and quantities
Maximization of (2) leads to the familiar inverse demand functions, e.g.
for any non-traded home good i d , and similar for traded products, given that the number of products is large. Then, profit maximization of (3) with respect to x d and maximizing (4) with respect to x t and x z results in the price
for sales on the home and the foreign market respectively. Since p t = p d , consumers do not distinguish between non-traded home products and traded home products; and hence, sales quantities of trading firms on their home market must be identical to that of non-trading firms, i.e. x d = x t . Yet, exported goods are more expensive than domestically produced goods and by symmetry p z = p * z , i.e. the price that a home firm charges abroad is the same as the price charged by foreign exporters on our home market. In equilibrium, maximization of utility (2) requires that the ratio of the marginal utility of an extra consumption unit equals the price ratio, i.e.
Utilizing the goods market clearing conditions, this implies
Thus exporting firms charge the same price on their home market and have the same sales volume as non-trading firms, but charge higher prices and sell less of their variety on the foreign market. By the same token, domestic consumers pay more and consume less of imported product varieties compared to domestically produced varieties. With these relations in place, production scale can be determined as driven by free entry/exit. Firms know the distribution of a i 's and the relation given in (7). Furthermore, there must exist some cut-off level,ā, of the firm specific fixed export costs denoting the firm that is exactly indifferent between engaging in exports and being a non-trading firm. Then, entry of firms occurs until expected profits equal fixed entry cost f , in particular π
Using (3) and (4) and realizing that 7 Here, we depart significantly from Schmitt and Yu (2001) , where firms determine entry subject to reaching breakeven on their home market operation. Instead, we follow Melitz (2003) , namely firms determine their entry subject to expected profits and sunk cost, accordingly some firms will make profits and some losses in equilibrium. 6 the expected fixed costs of exporting must beā 2 , the equation reads:
Inserting from above (8) can be solved for x d to yield:
which is also the home market production scale of exporting firms (x t ) and can be plugged into (7) to determine x z . Note that in autarky (where the tariff is the prohibitive τ = 1 and accordinglyā = 0), the production scale reaches the textbook case, namely
The indifferent firm
With the prices and quantities derived above, it is straightforward to identify the firm which is indifferent as to becoming an exporting firm or becoming a pure domestic firm. This firm is characterized by a fixed cost of exportinḡ a such that π z,ā = π d must hold. Since profits (losses) stemming from home market sales are the same for both types of firms, the condition becomes (1 − τ )p z x z − (ā + βx z )w = 0, i.e. the indifferent firm makes zero profits from the exporting activity. After setting in p z , and x z from above, one can solve:
All firms i such that a i ∈ [0,ā] make non-negative profits from exporting, while all firms i such that a i ∈]ā, α] are non-trading firms. Notice that by (10) we haveā > 0 and that in the free trade situation (τ = 0) we havē a| τ =0 < α. The reason forā| τ =0 < α is as follows. With zero tariffs, the sales scale on the home and the foreign market respectively are identical (x d = x z ). Since exporting promises expected profits, this scale is competed so small (via entry) that the home sales will not breakeven, accordingly the exporting activity of a firm with fixed export costs a i = α must also result in negative profits, hence also with free trade (τ = 0) some firms are nontrading firms choosing to minimize their losses by refraining from exporting. Furthermore,ā decreases in the tariff rate (see appendix A.1), implying that the least efficient (high a i ) firms will cease their trading activity in response to a tariff increase.
The number of firms
The total number of firms at home, n = n t + n d , is determined via the income expenditure clearing condition Lw
where n t = n f , where n t = F (ā)n, n d = (1 − F (ā))n, and where R is the redistributed tariff income and fixed entry cost f -or equivalently total firm profits excluding entry investment (see (8)). One gets:
Because of trade, consumers also have access to foreign varieties, in particular due to symmetry n t = n * t = n f = F (ā)n and accordingly the number of varieties available on the home market are given byñ = n + n f .
Welfare Results
Consumer utility is our measure of welfare. Given goods market clearing and (2), we can write
, and setting in values from above and simplifying gives:
The following results can be stated. accordingly U/(U | autarky ) = 1. To the left, for τ = 0, we are in the free trade situation, and welfare in both countries is clearly above the autarky level. However, imposing a small bilateral tariff increases welfare until we reach the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff,τ , beyond which welfare starts to decrease towards the autarky level. What proposition 1 implies is in fact that there is too much trade in the free trade situation. National and world welfare increases when imposing small bilateral tariffs. The welfare maximizing bilateral ad valorem tariff is strictly positive, less than 1 and increases in the degree of product differentiation, θ, (love of variety). Accordingly, trade liberalization, in particular the bilateral reduction of tariffs smaller thanτ , will be welfare-reducing. To illustrate the intuition for the result, it is useful to break down the contributing factors. First, examine the number of firms given in (11) and in particular the number of varieties available on the home market given bỹ n = n + n f . It turns out that with the imposition of a small bilateral tariff, the exit of trading firms and therewith the loss of n t and n f is compensated by the entry of additional pure domestic firms n d , in fact slightly increasingñ at first before it falls for larger tariffs. basket foreign products have been replaced with home products. The second contribution to an utility increase stems from the changes in the output volumes, x d and x z that can be consumed. As can be seen from (9) and (7), a tariff increases the output volume of domestic varieties available to domestic consumers and reduces the output volume directed at the foreign market (and hence, the consumption volume of each imported variety).
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Thus even if the number of available varieties was just constant (and not increasing), then the pure shift from foreign varieties to home varieties paired with an increase in the amounts consumed of each home variety would constitute an utility increase.
To see the logic of these changes in the number of available varieties and the consumption volumes, consider the following reasoning. A small bilateral tariff reduces the number of imported varieties and -via the imposed price increase of foreign products -the import volume of all remaining varieties. However, overall a small tariff still increases welfare because the least efficient exporters are the first to cease their trading activity. Paired with the additional resources saved by reducing the trading activity of all remaining exporting firms, enough resources are freed for the production of more home varieties in larger quantities. That is, the tariff reduces the volume of each remaining importer/exporter but converts it into additional domestic entry and consumption. However, beyond the welfare maximizing bilateral tariff, τ , an additional increase in the tariff further cuts imported volumes, and more importantly, it forces fairly efficient exporters out of the trading activity. Thus, additional variants produced relatively cheaply (i.e. by foreign exporters who have fairly low fixed export costs) are replaced with variants produced relatively expensively (i.e. by new home producers incurring the fixed production costs, α).
In line with this reasoning, it turns out that the total fixed costs per available variety that occur to a country ((nα + n tā 2 )/ñ) as a function of τ are U-shaped. Thus a small bilateral tariff, by forcing expensive (high a i ) exporters/importers out reduces the amount of fixed costs that society has to tie up in order to generate variety. facts of international trade, e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001) , Montagna (2001) , Melitz (2003) , Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Yeaple (2005) , but has not yet been used to examine trade policies systematically.
Our model examines bilateral ad valorem tariffs in a symmetric twocountry intra-industry trade model, with firm-level heterogeneous fixed costs of exporting. We find that in this model there is in fact too much trade in the free trade equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing activity than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility. There exists a strictly positive bilateral tariff that maximizes national and world welfare. Accordingly, trade liberalization, in particular the reciprocal reduction of small tariffs, is welfare-reducing. This contradicts much of the existing literature. The underlying mechanism for our result is that even though small bilateral tariffs reduce the number of traded varieties, the number of available varieties in both countries is maintained and consumption volumes of home products increase. This mechanism is at work even though the fixed costs of creating a new domestic variety are always larger than the firm-specific fixed costs of exporting and even though there are no wasteful (e.g. iceberg) trade costs. Thus, the application of more realistic and powerful specifications for the workhorse model of intra-industry trade dose not only answer many of the conflicts between stylized facts and theory, it also raises important new issues. Future research should address the welfare effects of trade policies for different forms of firm-level heterogeneity and for more types of trade barriers.
A.4 The number of firms and available varieties Figure A .1 plots the number of firms, n, the number of pure domestic producers, n d , and exporting producers, n t , and the total number of available varieties,ñ, as a function of τ . Other parameter values are α = 2.5, β = 0.5, θ = 0.4, f = 1, L = 100. 
